Actions, Attitudes, and the Obligation to Obey the Law by Gur, N
Pre-­‐publication	  version	  
Published	  in:	  (2013)	  23	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  326–346	  
	  
	   	   1	  
	  
	  
Actions,  Attitudes,  and  the  Obligation  to	  
	  







If	   you	   put	   it	   to	   a	   contemporary	   legal	   or	   political	   theorist	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	  moral	   obligation	  
to	   obey	   the	   law’	   it	   is	   highly	  unlikely	   they	  would	  be	   taken	  aback	  or	  raise	  an	  eyebrow.	  For	  such	  
a	  denial	  is	  not	  only	  a	  mainstream	  position	  in	  modern	  scholarly	  discourse	  about	  the	  obligation	  to	  
obey	  	  the	  	   law,	  	  but	  possibly	   even	   the	   currently	   dominant	  one.1	  	   For	   students	  who	  make	   their	  
first	  foray	   into	   the	   literature	   on	   this	   topic,	   however,	   this	   fact	   often	   comes	   as	   a	  surprise.	  2	  
They	   are	   surprised	   because	   the	   above,	   highly	   influential	   scholarly	   view	   appears	   to	   fly	   in	  	  
the	   face	   of	   a	   basic	   idea	   they	   have	   absorbed	   from	   an	   early	   stage	   of	   their	   upbringing:	   	  
the	   idea	   that	   law-­‐abidingness	   is	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   good	   citizenship	  —	   that	   being	   a	   good	  
citizen,	   as	   we	   all	   ought	   to	   be,	   implies	   inter	   alia	   being	   a	   law-­‐abiding	   citizen.	   How	   are	   	  
we	   to	   explain	   the	   apparent	   tension	  between	   this	   common	   pre-­‐theoretical	   conception	   and	  
the	   strong	   current	   of	   scepticism	   among	   scholars?	   If	   the	   arguments	   of	   sceptical	  	  
scholars	   seem	   cogent,	   should	   we	   conclude	   that	   the	   socially	   prevalent	   attitude	   towards	  	  
law,	  	  an	  attitude	  that	  emerged	  through	  a	  millennia-­‐long	  civilisation	  process	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  
	  
	  
1	  See,	   e.g.,	   Robert	   P.	   Wolff,	   In   Defense   of   Anarchism   (New	   York:	   Harper	   &	   Row,	   1970);	  M.	  B.	  E.	  Smith,	  
‘Is	   there	  a	  prima	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  obligation	  to	  obey	   the	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  Yale   Law   Journal,	  82	   (1973),	  950–76;	  A.	  D.	  Woozley,	  Law  and  
Obedience  (London:	  Duckworth,	  1979);	  Joseph	  Raz,	  The  Authority  of  Law  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1979),	  pp.	  233–
49;	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  John	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   Princeton	  University	  Press,	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  York:	  Wiley,	  1979);	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  ‘Political	  authority	  and	  
political	   obligation’,	   Virginia   Law   Review,	   67	   (1981),	   3–17;	   David	   Lyons,	   ‘Need,	   necessity,	   and	   political	  
obligation’,	  Virginia   Law   Review,	   67	   (1981),	   63–77;	   Joseph	   Raz,	   ‘The	   obligation	   to	   obey:	   revision	  and	   tradition’,	  
Notre  Dame  Journal  of  Law,  Ethics  &  Public  Policy,	  1	  (1984),	  139–55;	  Kent	  Greenawalt,	  Conflicts  of  Law  and  Morality  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1987);	  Leslie	  Green,	  The  Authority  of  the  State  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1988).	  
2	  This	   anecdotal	   observation	   corresponds	   with	   the	   results	   of	   empirical	   studies	   about	   common	  attitudes	  
of	  ordinary	  citizens	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Tom	  R.	  Tyler,	  Why  People  Obey  the  Law  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  
p.	   45)—attitudes	   whose	   existence	   is	   acknowledged	   by	   several	   of	   the	   above	   cited	   writers	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Raz,	   The  
Authority  of   Law,	  p.	   235;	  Simmons,	  Moral  Principles  and  Political  Obligations,	  p.	   3;	   Smith,	   ‘Is	   there	  a	   prima	   facie	  
obligation	  to	  obey	  the	  law?’,	  p.	  975.	  See	  contra:	  	  Leslie	  	  Green,	  	  ‘Who    believes    in    political    obligation?’,	  	  For    and    









In	 this	 article	 I	 will	 reject	 this	 possibility	 and	 will	 try	 to	 make	 some	 headway	 towards	 an	
alternative	 explanation.	 I	 say	 ‘some	 headway’	 because	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 relation	
between	the	scholarly	and	the	popular	views	would	extend	beyond	the	confines	of	this	article	
and	will	not	be	attempted	here.	What	I	will	do,	however,	is	to	examine	each	of	them	and	argue	
that	 (i)	 at	 least	 under	 certain	 ethical	 presuppositions,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 denying	 the	
obligation	 to	obey	the	law;	but	(ii)	even	if	there	is	no	obligation	to	obey	the	law,	the	common	
attitude	of	 law’s	 subjects,	 that	 is,	 their	 law-abiding	disposition,	reflects	not	 a	regrettable	error	
but	a	desirable	attitude	which	they	have	good	reasons	to	retain.	
I	will	pursue	this	inquiry	in	two	stages.	First,	in	Sections	I	and	II	the	question	of	the	obligation	
to	 obey	 the	 law	 will	 be	 analysed	 through	 an	 evaluative	 prism	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 moral	
implications	of	our	actions	 (of	obedience	or	disobedience),	rather	 than	 the	moral	 implications	
of	our	attitudes	towards	law.	This	analysis	will	point	to	the	conclusion	that	although	there	is	an	
obligation	to	obey	some	 laws	 in	 some	situations,	and	although	the	 scope	of	 that	obligation	 is	




thing	 that	 (as	 subjects	 of	 a	 reasonably	 just	 legal	 system)	we	have	 the	 attitude	of	 law-abiding	
citizens,	the	attitude	of	being	disposed	to	comply	with	law.	
A	 number	of	 preliminary	clarifications	are	 called	 for.	 Firstly,	 throughout	 this	article	 I	 will	 be	












of	 Washington	 Press,	 1958),	 pp.	 100–5;	 H.	 L.	 A.	 Hart,	 ‘Are	 there	 any	 natural	 rights?’	 Philosophical	 Review,	 64	
(1955),	 175–91	 at	 fn.	 7;	 Richard	 B.	 Brandt,	 ‘The	 concepts	 of	obligation	and	duty’,	Mind,	73	(1965),	374–93;	John	
Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice,	rev.	ed.	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1999),	pp.	93–101;	Simmons,	Moral	










of	 all	 possible	arguments	 for	 the	obligation	 to	 obey	 the	 law.	 Such	analyses	are	offered	 in	 the	
existing	 literature	and	their	 replication	is	both	 impossible	and	unnecessary	in	an	article	whose	
primary	objective	is	not	to	conclusively	resolve	the	question	of	whether	there	 is	an	obligation	
to	 obey	 the	 law,	 	 but	 	 rather	 	 to	 	 show	 	 the	 	 pertinence	 	and	 	 significance	 of	 	 a	 	 law-abiding	
attitude.	Rather	than	discussing	the	full	range	of	arguments	for	the	obligation	to	obey	the	 law,	
then,	I	will	focus	on	two	types	of	argument	that	I	consider	to	be	the	most	relevant	and	fruitful	
for	 the	purpose	of	 this	 inquiry:	namely,	arguments	 based	 on	 necessity	 considerations	 and	 on	
fairness	 considerations.	There	 is,	however,	 a	 third	 type	 of	 argument—based	on	 the	 notion	of	
consent—which	 is	 too	 important	 to	 be	 set	 aside	 without	 at	 least	 briefly	 indicating	 why	 I	
consider	 it	 to	 be	 unpromising:	 the	 main	 reason,	 highlighted	 by	 several	 writers,	 is	 that	very	
few	people	have	actually	consented	to	come	under	a	general	obligation	to	obey	the	 law.5	 ‘The	
paucity	 of	 express	 consentors’,	 as	 A.	 John	 Simmons	 writes,	 ‘is	 painfully	 apparent’,6	 whereas	
tacit	consent	to	an	obligation	to	obey	the	law	cannot	be	widely	inferred	without	‘stretching	the	
notion	of	consent	far	beyond	the	breaking	point’,7	 for	example,	by	 inferring	it	 from	the	act	of	
voting	 in	democratic	elections,	which	 is	 less	 than	a	 clear	and	unequivocal	sign	of	 a	deliberate	
undertaking	 of	 such	 an	 obligation;8	 or	 from	 the	 fact	 of	 residence,	which,	 given	 the	 practical	
difficulties	involved	in	emigrating,	let	alone	the	practical	impossibility	of	finding	a	territory	with	
no	 sovereign	at	 all,	 effectively	 lacks	 	 the	 	degree	 	of	 	 free	 	choice	 	and	 	available	 alternatives	
requisite	 for		the	binding	force	of	consent.9	
A	 fourth	 and	 final	 preliminary	 comment	 concerns	 a	 working	 premise	 I	 will	 adopt	 for	
purposes	of	this	analysis:	I	will	assume	that	one	of	the	necessary	conditions	 for	 there	 to	 be	 a	
moral	 obligation	 to	 perform	 some	 action	 (‘A’)	 is	that	either	A	itself	or	its	consequences	satisfy	




5	 See,	 e.g.,	 David	 Hume,	 ‘Of	 the	 original	 contract’,	 in	 Hume,	 Political	 Essays,	 ed.	 K.	 Haakonssen	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1994),	pp.	186–201;	Smith,	 ‘Is	 there	a	prima	facie	obligation	 to	 obey	 the	 law?’,	 pp.	
960–4;	 Simmons,	Moral	 Principles	 and	 Political	 Obligations,	pp.	57–100;	cf.	Joseph	Raz,	The	Morality	of	Freedom	






pp.	 192–3.	 Another	 type	 of	 theory	which	 I	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 discuss	 here	 is	 associative	 obligation	 theory.	 For	
statements	 of	 the	 theory	 see,	 e.g.,	 Dworkin,	 ibid.,	 pp.	 195–215;	 John	 Horton,	 Political	 Obligation,	 2nd	 ed.	
(Basingstoke:	 Macmillan,	 2010),	 pp.	 135–91.	 See	 contra:	 A.	 John	 Simmons,	 Justification	 and	 Legitimacy	
(Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2001),	pp.	 65–92.	 For	 a	 recent	 reformulation	of	 associative	 obligation	








As	 the	word	some	suggests,	 the	 condition	will	 not	be	 associated	with	any	particular	value—it	
will	 not,	 for	 example,	 be	 exclusively	 linked	 with	 utility	 or	 welfare—but	 rather	 will	 be	






inquiry	 to	 assume	 this	 condition,	 because	 it	 underpins	much	 of	 the	 contemporary	 scepticism	
about	the	obligation	 to	 obey	 the	 law,11		 and	 because	 a	 primary	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	show	
that	 even	 from	 that	 sceptical	 viewpoint	 the	 value	 of	 a	 law-abiding	 attitude	 should	 be	
acknowledged.	






The	 first	argument	 I	 will	 consider	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 notion	 of	 necessity.	 This	argument	 finds	






10	See,	 e.g.,	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 Groundwork	 of	 the	 Metaphysics	 of	 Morals,	 4:421,	 Critique	 of	Practical	Reason,	
5:72,	and	The	Metaphysics	of	Morals,	6:389.	
11	See,	e.g.,	Raz,	The	Authority	of	Law,	pp.	237–42,	Raz,	‘The	obligation	to	obey:	revision	and	tradition’,	 145–55	
(who,	 in	 denying	 the	 obligation	 to	 obey	 the	 law,	 points	 out	 situations	where	‘conforming	with	the	law	will	serve	
no	useful	purpose’	and	where	failures	to	conform	will	amount	to	‘innocuous	acts	which	neither	harm	any	one	nor	
impede	the	provision	of	any	public	good’);	Smith,	‘Is	there	a	prima	facie	obligation	to	obey	the	law?’,	pp.	956–60,	
969–73	 (who	 invokes	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘because	laws	must	necessarily	be	designed	to	cover	 large	numbers	of	cases,	
obedience	 to	 the	 law	often	 benefits	 no	 one	 .	 .	 .	 [and	 that]	 virtually	 every	 legal	 system	 contains	 a	 number	 of	
pointless	.	.	.	laws,	obedience	to	which	.	.	.	benefits	no	one’);	Donald	H.	Regan,	‘Law’s	halo’,	Social	Philosophy	&	Policy,	
4	(1986),	15–30	at	pp.	15–19	(e.g.,	‘[t]he	fact	I	am	pointing	to	when	I	say	there	is	no	obligation	to	obey	the	law	is	.	
.	 .	 [that]	there	are	some	cases	where	a	particular	act	 is	 illegal	but	where	there	 is	no	moral	 reason	at	all	 to	avoid	
that	 act’);	 Leslie	 Green,	 ‘Legal	 obligation	 and	 authority’,	 Stanford	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Philosophy,	 ed.	 E.	 N.	 Zalta	
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/>	 (whose	 denial	 of	 an	 obligation	 to	 obey	 relies,	 inter	 alia,	 on	
facts	such	as	this:	‘a	legal	system	can,	and	does,	tolerate	a	certain	amount	of	harmless	disobedience	.	.	.’).	












A	 small	 degree	 of	 experience	 and	 observation	 suffices	 to	 teach	 us,	 that	 society	cannot	possibly	
be	maintained	without	 the	 authority	 of	 magistrates,	 and	 that	 this	 authority	must	 soon	 fall	 into	
contempt,	where	exact	obedience	 is	 not	payed	 [sic]	 to	 it.	 The	 observation	of	 these	 general	 and	












voluntarist	 principle.	 It	 belongs	 to	 a	 class	 of	 requirements	 that	 are	 thought	 to	 apply	 to	 us	
irrespective	of	whether	we	have	willed	or	consented	to	them.16		Other	notable	members	of	this	




So	 too,	 according	 to	 the	 argument	 from	 necessity,	 our	 duty	 not	 to	 undermine	 arrangements	




[N2]	 Governance	 through	 law	 is	 necessary	 for	 securing	 certain	 goods	 without	 which	 an	
acceptable	life	for	members	of	society	would	not	be	possible.18	
	
Consider,	 for	 example,	 the	 infrastructure	 that	 a	 society	 requires	 for	 its	 operation19	 or		
the	 organised	 forces	 needed	 for	 national	 defence	 against	 attacks	 by	 foreign	 enemies.		
These	are	essential	goods	whose	provision	necessitates	forms	of	social	cooperation	that	are	not	
likely	 to	 be	 achieved	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 government	 and	 its	 legal	means	 of	 guiding	 conduct.		
In	 like	 manner,	 governments	 are	 necessary	 for	 securing	 the	 degree	 of	 social	 order,		
stability,	and	interpersonal	forbearance	that	is	 requisite	 for	 an	 acceptable	 life;	 in	 the	 absence		
of	 laws,	 judges,	 and	 policemen,	 ‘encroachments	of	 the	 strong	 upon	 the	weak,	 of	 the	 violent	
















lapse	 into	a	 state	of	nature	 in	which	our	physical	 integrity	and	basic	means	of	 living	would	be	
subject	to	constant	transgressions	by	other	members	of	society.21	
An	important	objection	that	may	be	raised	at	this	point	insists	that	although	life	in	the	state	
of	nature	is	likely	to	be	nasty,	brutish,	and	short,	it	should	not	be	assumed	that	 life	 in	any	 law-
governed	society	would	be	 better.	As	 history	bears	witness,	 there	can	be	 regimes	 that	are	 so	
extremely	iniquitous	that	one	might	doubt	whether	life	under	their	rule	would	be	preferable	to	












It	 should	 be	 made	 clear	 that	 premise	 N3	 expresses	 a	 concern	 not	 only	 with	 the	 direct	 and	
immediate	 consequences	 of	 our	 disobedient	 actions,	 but	 also	 with	 their	 likely	 influence	on	
the	behaviour	of	other	actors	(hereinafter	the	argument	from	example):	those	who	witness	or	
hear	about	our	disobedient	actions	would	often	be	 stimulated	this	way	 into	breaking	 the	 law	




obey	 the	 law.	 But	 they	 are	 not.	 At	 least	 one	 of	 these	 premises,	N3,	mistakes	 or	 at	 any	 rate	
grossly	 exaggerates	 the	 true	 facts.	 As	 Joseph	 Raz	 critically	 remarked,	 ‘it	 is	 a	 melodramatic	






earlier),	but	rather	that	 its	content-independence	 is	merely	relative,	rather	than	absolute:	 it	 is	 an	 obligation	 that	
applies	to	a	wide,	but	not	unlimited,	range	of	possible	‘contents’	that	lawmakers	may	adopt.	












governments	 usually	 have	 at	 their	 disposal	 means	 that	 they	 can	 effectively	 handle	 a	 fairly	
significant	 amount	 of	 disobedience	 and	 maintain	 their	 grip	 on	 the	 population	 in	 the	 face	of	
some	 recalcitrant	behaviour.26	 Second,	 although	 certain	 public	 acts	 of	 civil	 disobedience	 that	
express	 revolt	 against	 the	 government,	 or	 some	 law	 contraventions	 by	 highly	 visible	 legal	
officials,	may	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	on	 socially	accepted	attitudes	 towards	 the	 law,	 this	 is	
hardly	the	case	with	most	types	of	law	violation	by	a	private	citizen.	Given	the	typically	large	size	




to	 the	 law’s	 efficacy	 would	 be	 far	 from	 negligible.	 This	 last	 statement,	 however,	 is	 a	
hypothetical	 statement	 (‘If	 everyone	.	 .	 .’);	 it	 does	 not	purport	to	be	a	description	of	existing	
facts.	Nor	does	it	purport	to	describe	an	outcome	that	would	actually	follow	from	an	act	of	law	
violation	 in	 ordinary	 conditions.	As	 such,	 that	 statement	 is	not	 relevant	to	our	analysis	 in	 this	
section,	which	focuses	purely	on	necessity	considerations	(though	it	will	become	relevant	in	 the	
following	 section,	 when	 fairness	 arguments	 will	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	 analysis).	 From	 the	
perspective	of	our	current	assessment,	what	matters	is	the	actual	impact	our	actions	are	likely	




A	 third	 and	 final	 point	 that	 serves	 to	 debunk	 N3	 is	 that	 there	 are	 situations		
where	 violating	 a	 law	 would	 be	 entirely	 harmless	 as	 well	 as	 impervious	 to	 the		
argument	 from	 example.	 Consider	 the	 familiar	 example	 of	 a	 driver	 who	 comes		






not	 correspond	 with	 a	 full-blooded	 version	 of	 rule-consequentialism	 (what	 Brad	 Hooker	 calls	 full	 rule-
consequentialism:	 see	 his	 entry	 ‘Rule	 consequentialism’,	 in	 Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	ed.	 E.	N.	 Zalta	
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-	rule>),	which	is	a	theory	that	not	only	uses	a	consequentialist	
criterion	to	select	rules	that	should	guide	our	practical	deliberation,	but	also	contends	that	such	rules	determine	the	















and	 stimulate	 them	 into	 disobedient	 behaviour.29	 Even	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 such	 situations—
where	it	 is	 completely	 clear	 that	 violating	 the	 law	would	have	no	negative	effects—are	rather	
infrequent,	they	nevertheless	exist	and	thus	 serve	as	 valid,	and	very	clear,	 counterexamples	to	
premise	N3.	
The	 foregoing	observations	suggest	 that,	 far	 from	establishing	a	 general	obligation	 to	 obey	
the	 law,	 the	 argument	 from	 necessity	 grounds,	 at	 best,	 an	obligation	whose	scope	is	confined	
to	certain	individuals,	 laws,	or	situations.	That	 is,	 it	 grounds	 an	 obligation	 that	 applies	 only	
when	 and	 insofar	 as	 an	 act	 of	non-compliance	would	have	an	appreciable	destabilising	effect	on	
the	government’s	effective	authority.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	consider	whether	a	fortified	













an	 agent	who	 contemplates	breaking	 a	 law	 should,	 instead	 of	 relying	 on	 premise	 N3	 above,	
reason	in	the	following	way:	
	
[F1]	 Although	a	 law	violation	on	my	part	would	have	no	more	than	a	negligible	effect	 on	 the	
law’s	 efficacy,	 if	 everyone	 disobeyed	 the	 law	 the	 cumulative	 effect	 would	 be	 far	 from	







Now,	 although	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 improves	 upon	 the	 pure	 necessity	 argument	 examined	
above	and	strengthens	the	grounds	for	an	obligation	to	obey	the	law,	it	 is	nonetheless	guilty	of	













Before	 I	 turn	 to	 this	 issue,	 however,	 another	 possible	 objection	 against	 the	 integrated	
argument	 should	 be	mentioned	 and	 rejected.	 The	 objection	 I	 have	 in	mind	 contends	 that	 a	
fairness-based	obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 a	 cooperative	scheme	arises	only	when	the	benefits	
of	 the	 scheme	have	 been	 voluntarily	accepted.31	 However,	the	objection	continues,	receipt	of	
public	 goods	 such	as	 the	 benefits	 of	 national	 defence	 or	 social	 order	 cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	
voluntary	for	the	 simple	 reason	 that,	 when	 these	 goods	 are	 supplied	 in	 a	 given	 country,	 all	
residents	inevitably	receive	them.	These	goods	are	unavoidable	in	the	sense	that,	so	long	as	one	




regarded	as	 the	product	of	 free	 choice.	According	to	 the	objection,	 therefore,	 receipt	of	such	
benefits	is	not	to	be	treated	as	a	voluntary	act	capable	of	giving	rise	to	a	fairness-based	obligation.	
This	objection	appears	cogent	when	levelled	against	the	traditional	and	basic	type	of	 fair-play	
argument.32		It	 is	 not	 a	 good	objection,	however,	 against	 the	argument	we	are	now	discussing,	
which	is	an	argument	that	combines	fairness	considerations	with	necessity	considerations.	Even	
if	benefiting	from	public	goods	such	as	social	order,	protection	against	interpersonal	violence,	or	
national	defence	does	not	amount	to	 voluntarily	choosing	them,	 the	 fact	 that	 such	goods	are	
indispensable	 for	 an	 acceptable	 life	 suggests	 that	 virtually	 all	 people	would	 opt	 for	 them	 if	
given	a	free	choice	and	would	pursue	them	if	that	was	necessary	for	their	receipt.33		They	would	
certainly	do	so	 if	they	faced	the	dire	consequences	liable	 to	occur	when	those	vital	goods	are	
absent,	 for	 example,	 in	conditions	 that	 exposed	 them	 to	 imminent	 danger	 of	 death,	 bodily	
harm,	 or	sexual	assault.	If	there	exist	individuals	who	would	even	in	such	conditions	genuinely	
reject	 those	goods,	 these	are	 likely	 to	be	 individuals	bereft	of	minimum	rationality	and	 sound	
mind,	who	therefore	also	lack	the	moral	competence	needed	in	order	to	be	the	bearers	of,	not	
just	 an	 obligation	 to	 obey	 the	 law,	 but	 any	 obligation.	 The	 position	 of	 such	 individuals,	





Publishing,	 1974),	 pp.	 93–5;	 Simmons,	Moral	 Principles	 and	 Political	 Obligations,	 pp.	 118–42;	 Dworkin,	 Law’s	
Empire,	pp.	192–3.	
32	Hart,	‘Are	there	any	natural	rights?’,	pp.	185–6;	Rawls,	‘Legal	obligation	and	the	duty	of	fair	play’,	pp.	3–18.	
33	 George	Klosko,	 ‘Multiple	principles	of	political	obligation’,	Political	Theory,	32	 (2004),	801–24	 at	 pp.	 805–6;	
George	 Klosko,	 The	 Principle	 of	 Fairness	 and	 Political	 Obligation	 (Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	1992),	pp.	
39–57.	









the	fact	that	the	vital	goods	in	question	are	clearly	such	that	one	would	opt	for	them	 if	 given	 a	
free	 choice,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 one	 actually	benefits	 from	 them,35	 	seems	 to	
me	 sufficient	 to	 fill	 the,	 so	 to	 speak,	 normative	gap	 left	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 actual	 voluntary	
acceptance.36	 To	get	a	 clearer	view	of	 this	 point,	 imagine	 an	 individual	 (‘John’)	 who	 enjoys	 a	
basic	 public	 good	 (‘X’),	which	 is	 absolutely	essential	 for	 people’s	 (including	his	 own)	 physical	
security	and	health,	but	who	declines	to	share	the	collective	burdens	through	which	 X	 is	 made	
available.	 Again,	 X	 may	 consist	 of	 goods	 such	 as	 national	 defence,	 crime	 prevention,	 the	
maintenance	 of	 public	 order,	 or	 infrastructural	 services	 essential	 for	 public	 health	 (e.g.,	 a	
municipal	 sewer	 system	and	 refuse	collection	and	disposal),	whose	provision,	let	us	suppose,	is	
made	possible	through	a	 specific	tax	 designated	 for	 that	 purpose	or,	 in	 the	 former	examples,	
through	collective	participation	in	a	military	or	civil	service.	
Now	 suppose	 that	 one	 of	 John’s	 fellows	 (‘Tim’)	 gives	 vent	 to	 his	 disapproval	of	 John’s	 free	
riding	and	puts	 it	 to	him	that	his	behaviour	is	unfair.	Given	that	X	 is	 a	 vital	 and	 indispensable	
good,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 what	 John	 could	 say	 in	 reply,	 unless	 he	 could	 point	 out		
some	 morally	 relevant	 difference	 between	 him	 and	 his	 fellow	 citizens,	 perhaps	 a	 genuine	
conscientious	 objection	 or	 a	 religious	 belief	 that	 prevents	 him	 from	 taking	 part	 in	 the		
relevant	 activity.37	 Suppose	 that	 he	 is	 unable	 to	 point	 out	 any	 such	 personal	 attribute		
that	 sets	 him	 apart	 from	 his	 fellows	 and	 that	 his	 response	 to	 Tim’s	 condemnation	 is	 this:		
‘how	 can	 you	 say	 that	 my	 failure	 to	 uphold	 X	 is	 unfair	 when	 no	 one	 has	 ever	 asked		
me	 whether	 I	 actually	 want	 the	 benefits	 of	 X	 and	 I	 have	 never	 requested	 it?’	 Tim	 replies:		
‘but	 X	 is	 necessary	 for	 your	 own	 physical	 security	 and	 health,	 so	 not	 only	 do	 you	 benefit		
from	 it,	 but	 clearly	 you	 would	 also	 opt	 for	 it	 if	 given	 the	 choice.	 Indeed,	 if	 you	were	 faced		
with	 the	 adversities	 that	 X	 prevents,	 you	 would	 be	 yearning	 for	 it.’	 If	 Tim’s	 last		
statement	 is	 correct	 (as	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 be,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 X)	 then	 John	 is	morally	 barred		
from	 using	 the	 argument	 that	 he	 has	 never	 voluntarily	 chosen	 the	 goods	 in	 question;		
the	dissonance	between	that	argument	and	his	true	preferences	would	amount	to	insincerity—





35	 It	 will	 also	 be	 recalled	 that	 the	 goods	 under	 consideration	 are	 public	 goods	 dependent	 on	 a	 cooperative	
scheme.	
36	My	 stance	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 largely	 consistent	 with	 that	 of	 Klosko,	 who	 labels	 such	 goods	‘presumptively	
beneficial	 goods’	 (note	 33	 above).	 See	 contra:	 Simmons,	 Justification	 and	 Legitimacy,	 pp.	 31–6.	 Simmons’	
counterexamples	are,	 I	 think,	 unpersuasive,	because	 they	 involve	 goods	which	are	not	‘presumptively	beneficial’	
(ibid.,	p.	33),	or	which	the	relevant	agent	does	not	actually	consume	(ibid.,	 p.	 34),	 or	 which	 he	 could	 effectively	
secure	 by	 himself,	 independently	 of	 the	 cooperative	scheme,	but	the	scheme	prevents	him	from	doing	so	(ibid.,	
p.	36).	









himself,	or	 perhaps	even	perversely	desires	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 violence	and	 suffer	bodily	harm,	
then,	 once	 more,	 John	 seems	 to	 fall	 outside	 the	 range	 of	 minimally	 rational	 and	 morally	
competent	agents	capable	of	bearing	any	kind	of	obligation—in	which	case	his	position	is	hardly	
interesting	from	the	perspective	of	an	inquiry	about	the	obligation	to	obey	the	law.38	
So	 far	 we	 have	 observed	 that	 an	 argument	 which	 integrates	 necessity	 and	 fairness	
considerations	 has	 two	 main	 advantages	 over	 arguments	 that	 draw	 on	 necessity	 or	 fairness	
alone:	first,	unlike	a	pure	necessity	argument,	the	integrated	argument	holds	good	beyond	the	
confines	of	 situations	 in	which	a	 disobedient	act	would	actually	destabilise	the	 law’s	effective	
authority;	and,	second,	unlike	the	traditional	fair-play	argument,	the	integrated	argument	holds	
good	irrespective	of	whether	the	relevant	actor	has	voluntarily	opted	for	the	goods	in	question.	
It	 appears	 therefore	 that,	while	 considerations	of	 necessity	or	 fairness	alone	can	only	ground	
an	obligation	of	a	relatively	narrow	scope,	their	combination	 yields	 an	 obligation	whose	 scope	
is	 significantly	wider	 than	 the	sum	of	 its	parts.39	
Despite	 all	 this,	 however,	 even	 the	 integrated	 argument	 is	 liable	 to	 the	 charge	 of	 over-
generalising.	The	reason	is	 that,	as	 it	stands,	the	 integrated	argument	is	insufficiently	 sensitive	




performs	an	 action	which,	 if	 performed	by	 a	 sufficiently	large	number	of	other	people,	would	
cumulatively	have	such	negative	effects.	But	when	the	action	would	 have	 no	 negative	 effect	
whatsoever,	 whether	 performed	 by	 one	 or	 any	larger	number	of	participants,	it	is	hard	to	see	
why	it	should	be	regarded	as	unfair	to	anyone.40	 Consider	once	more	the	example	of	the	traffic	
light	in	the	desert.41	
In	 such	 circumstances	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 stopping	at	 the	 red	 light	would	 not	 benefit	 anyone	and	
that	failing	to	stop	would	cause	neither	physical	injury	nor	spread	of	disobedience.	Nor	does	 it	
implicate	a	state	of	imbalance	which	favours	one	individual	over	the	rest:	for	why	should	we	not	
accept,	as	a	qualification	of	F1–F3	 above,	 that	 all	 people	 who	 find	 themselves	 in	 that	 special	






39	 The	 integrated	 approach	 I	 have	 taken	 here	 shares	 certain	 features	 with	 Klosko,	 ‘Multiple	principles	 of	
political	obligation’,	and	Christopher	Wellman,	‘Toward	a	Liberal	Theory	of	Political	Obligation’,	Ethics,	111	(2001),	
735–59	at	pp.	740–54.	









circumstances	 declined	 to	 stop,	 society	 would	 not	 be	 worse	 off,	 not	 in	 the	 slightest.42	 This	
means	that	an	individual	who	performs	this	act	does	not,	eo	ipso,	 assume	a	 liberty	or	 gain	 an	
advantage	that,	as	 a	 rational	actor,	he	would	not	be	willing	to	extend	to	others—so	his	action	
should	not	be	regarded	as	unfair.	Thus,	it	appears	that	even	the	integrated	argument	falls	short	










different	 situations—including	 in	 the	 lonely	 traffic	 light	 case—do	 not	 occur	 entirely	
independently	 of	 each	 other,	 but	 rather	 share	 at	 least	 one	 common	 source:	 they	 are	 all	 his	
actions,	 and	 as	 such	 flow	 (at	 least	 partly)	 from	 his	 practical	 attitudes.	 A	 person’s	 attitudes	
towards	 practically	 significant	aspects	 of	 the	world	 around	him	 tend	 to	 influence	the	way	 he	
acts,45	 and,	more	specifically	pertinent	to	us,	a	person’s	attitude	towards	a	normative	practice	
such	as	law	tends	to	influence	the	actions	he	performs	when	faced	with	legal	requirements.46	This	













44	Nothing	 I	 will	 say	 here	 is	 intended	 to	 deny	 that	 actions	 are	 normatively	 significant	or	 that	 we	have	moral	
duties	 to	 perform	 or	 avoid	 certain	 actions—including,	 in	 some	 cases,	 acts	 of	 compliance	 with	 law.	 Rather,	 my	
contention	is	that	exclusive	focus	on	actions	leads	to	a	crucially	incomplete	account	of	law’s	normative	force.	
45	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	our	attitudes	and	actions	are	always	perfectly	aligned.	For	one	thing,	there	are	other	
factors	 that	 may	 influence	 behaviour,	 e.g.,	 external	 pressures,	 interests,	 or	 needs.	 For	 another,	 the	 degree	 of	
correlation	may	depend	on	variables	such	as	the	types	of	attitude	and	behaviour	involved.	But	it	is	undeniable	that	
some	of	our	attitudes	tend	to	affect	some	of	our	actions	(e.g.,	ceteris	paribus,	parsimonious	people	are	 less	 likely	
than	others	 to	 spend	money,	 risk-averse	people	are	 less	 likely	 than	others	 to	 engage	 in	 risky	 ventures,	and	 law-
abiding	 people	 are	 less	 likely	 than	 others	 to	 break	 the	 law).	 For	 an	 instructive	 discussion	 of	 the	 influence	 of	










also	 the	 attitude	 towards	 law	 that	 such	 an	 action	 presupposes	 and	 the	 likely	 effect	 of	 that	
attitude	on	our	actions	in	other	situations.	
Let	 us	 consider,	 then,	 the	 normative	 attitude	 from	which	 disobedience	 in	 the	 lonely	 traffic	
light	case	may	ensue.	We	need	not	detain	ourselves	for	this	purpose	with	the	attitude	of	the	‘bad	










This	means	 that	he	does	not	attach	 in	 his	practical	 reasoning	any	normative	significance	to	
law	qua	law	(otherwise	he	would	have	probably	stopped	at	the	red	light	in	the	above	situation,	
where	there	are	no,	or	only	trifling,	reasons	not	to).	He	does	not	regard	the	very	fact	that	law	
requires	 an	 action	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 its	 performance.	 Instead,	 he	 regards	 law	 as	 entirely	
transparent	 to	 its	 underlying	 objectives	 and	 values,	 examining	 in	 each	 case	 whether	 and	 to	
what	 extent	 compliance	 with	 the	 applicable	 legal	 rule	 would	 serve	 desirable	 substantive	
goals	 which	 underlie	 the	 rule	 (e.g.,	 the	 prevention	 of	 road	 accidents)	 and,	 possibly,	 whether	
non-compliance	 would	 set	 an	 example	 to	 other	 individuals	 which	 would	 have	 negative	
influence	 on	 their	 conduct.	 If	 he	 believes	 that	 no	such	 reasons	 for	 compliance	apply	 to	 the	
case	at	hand,	as	in	the	desert	traffic	light	situation,	he	breaks	the	law.	In	other	situations,	where	
he	 thinks	 that	 some	 such	 reasons	 do	 apply,	 he	 would	 weigh	 them	 against	 the	 reasons	 he	
believes	 himself	 to	 have	 for	 non-compliance,	 and	 would	 act	 upon	 his	 assessment	 of	 the	
balance	 of	 reasons.	 In	 the	 discussion	 that	 follows	 I	 will	 sometimes	 use	 the	 phrase	 law-
indifference	as	shorthand	for	the	above	mode	of	reasoning	and	attitude	towards	law.	
One	 fairly	 obvious	 problem	 with	 the	 above-described	 method	 of	 practical		
reasoning	 is	 the	 excessive	 amount	 of	 time	 and	 mental	 labour	 it	 consumes,		
which	 makes	 it	 a	 highly	 inefficient	 procedure	 of	 decision-making	 for	 purposes		














in	 the	 attitude	 it	 implicates	 is	 not	 so	 much	 their	 procedural	 inefficiency	 as	 their	 high	
susceptibility	to	substantive	error.	The	problem,	in	other	words,	is	that	those	who	reason	in	that	
way	and	have	that	attitude	towards	law	are	not	likely	to	strictly	confine	their	departures	from	




It	 should	 first	be	 brought	 to	mind	 that	when	making	 the	 above	 assessments	as	subjects	of	
the	law,	we	would	not	be	operating	in	neutral	‘laboratory	conditions’	free	from	temptations	to	
break	the	 law	and	optimally	suited	to	facilitate	 rational	decision-making.	Rather,	we	would	be	
making	 those	 assessments	 in	 our	 everyday	 settings	 of	 activity	 under	 the	 law—settings	 that	
frequently	 expose	 us	 to	 stimuli	 that	 pull	 the	 assessment	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 non-
compliance,	 such	 as	 the	 immediate	 inconvenience	 involved	 in	 following	 the	 rule	 and	 the	
short-term	 personal	 gains	 often	 attainable	 by	 breaking	 it.	 In	 these	 conditions	 of	 decision-
making	our	 assessments	 of	 law-following	 values	would	 tend	 to	 be	 partial,	 short-sighted,	 and	
influenced	by	other	situational	biases.49	
Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 perception	 and	 judgement	 of	 a	 driver	 who	 rushes	 to	 his		
destination	or	is	eager	to	arrive	home	after	a	long	day	of	work	is	not	likely	to	be	impervious	to	
the	 biasing	 influence	 of	 such	 motivational	 forces.	 He	 may	 thus	 easily	 be	 led	 to		
underestimate	 the	 dangers	 involved	 in	 exceeding	 the	 speed	 limit,	 overtaking	 on	 a		
solid	 line,	 or	 running	 a	 red	 light	 at	 a	 seemingly	 empty	 junction,	 and	 the	 chance		
of	 him	 misjudging	 the	 situation	 is	 itself	 not	 something	 he	 is	 likely	 to	 readily	 and	 fully	 	
recognise	 when	 thus	 placed.	 This	 is	 so	 not	 only	 because	people	are	often	not	 very	 good	at	
acknowledging	their	own	 limitations,	 incompetence,	and	 ill	 judgement—an	empirically	proven	







Canadian	Journal	of	 Law	and	Jurisprudence,	25	 (2012),	359–91	at	pp.	373–89.	Herein	 I	 will	 confine	myself	 to	 the	
brief	illustrations	below.	
50	 See,	 e.g.,	 Raymond	 Baumhart,	 An	 Honest	 Profit:	 What	 Businessmen	 Say	 About	 Ethics	 in	Business	 (New	
York:	 Holt,	 Rinehart	 and	Winston,	 1968),	 pp.	 20–5;	 Laurie	 Larwood	 and	William	Whittaker,	 ‘Managerial	myopia:	
self-serving	biases	 in	 organizational	planning’,	 Journal	of	Applied	Psychology,	62	(1977),	194–8;	Ola	Svenson,	‘Are	
we	all	less	risky	and	more	skillful	than	our	fellow	drivers?’	Acta	Psychologica,	47	(1981),	143–8;	Jonathon	D.	Brown,	
‘Evaluations	of	 self	 and	others:	 self-enhancement	biases	 in	 social	 judgments’,	Social	Cognition,	4	 (1986),	353–76;	
Justin	 Kruger	 and	 David	 Dunning,	 ‘Unskilled	 and	 unaware	 of	 it:	 how	 difficulties	 in	 recognizing	 one’s	 own	
incompetence	lead	to	 inflated	self-assessment’,	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	77	 (1999),	1121–34.	









hyperbolic	discounting:51	 namely,	a	 tendency	 for	 people	 to	 overvalue	 immediate	gratifications	





to	perform	his	part	 in	upholding	the	common	good	by	paying	a	 tax	 required	by	 the	 law.	Well	
intentioned	as	he	may	be,	his	judgement	is	nevertheless	prone	to	be	somewhat	overly	sensitive	
to	his	individual	circumstances	and	needs,	at	the	expense	of	wider	considerations	of	equity	and	
social	wellbeing.	 For,	 as	 Albert	 Venn	Dicey	 once	 noted,	 ‘[a]	man’s	 interest	 gives	 a	 bias	 to	 his	
judgement	far	oftener	than	it	corrupts	his	heart’52—a	human	propensity		well		documented		in		
modern		empirical		studies		under		the		label	self-serving	bias.53	
The	problems	illustrated	by	 these	examples	are	not	confined	to	 just	a	 small	handful	of	 laws	
or	a	 few	specific	situations.	They	are	problems	associated	with	prevalent	characteristics	of	law	
and	the	decision-making	environment	in	which	its	 subjects	operate,	 such	as	 the	 fact	 that	 legal	
rules	are	typically	designed	and	applied	in	a	prospective	manner	with	the	aim	of	forming	social	
arrangements	 sustainable	 through	 time,	whereas	 decisions	made	 by	 citizens	 in	 the	 course	 of	
day-to-day	activity	 are	 often	 instantaneous	decisions	about	how	 to	 act	 here	 and	now;	 or	 the	
fact	 that	 in	 creating	and	maintaining	cooperative	schemes	 for	 the	benefit	of	 society	 at	 large,	
law	 typically	 imposes	on	 individuals	 restrictions	and	burdens	which	are	 at	 variance	with	 their	





51	 See,	 e.g.,	 George	 Ainslie,	 ‘Specious	 reward:	 a	 behavioral	 theory	 of	 impulsiveness	 and	 impulse	 control’,	
Psychological	 Bulletin,	 82	 (1975),	 463–96;	 Richard	 J.	 Herrnstein,	 ‘Rational	 choice	 theory:	 necessary	 but	 not	
sufficient’,	 American	 Psychologist,	 45	 (1990),	 356–7;	 Gordon	 C.	 Winston	 and	 Richard	 G.	 Woodbury,	 ‘Myopic	
discounting:	empirical	evidence’,	Handbook	of	Behavioral	Economics,	ed.	S.	Kaish	and	B.	Gilad,	vol.	2B	(Greenwich,	
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Century,	2nd	ed.	(London:	Macmillan,	1914),	p.	15.	
53	See,		 e.g.,	 	 David		M.		Messick		 and		 Keith		 P.		 Sentis,	 	 ‘Fairness		 and		 preference’,	 	 Journal		 of	Experimental	
Social	 Psychology,	 15	 (1979),	 418–34;	 David	 M.	 Messick,	 ‘Social	 interdependence	 and	 decision	 making’,	
Behavioral	 Decision	 Making,	 ed.	 G.	 Wright	 (New	 York:	 Plenum,	 1985),	pp.	94–100;	Leigh	Thompson	and	George	
Loewenstein,	‘Egocentric	interpretations	of	fairness	and	interpersonal	conflict’,	Organizational	Behavior	and	Human	
Decision	Processes,	51	(1992),	176–97;	 Linda	 Babcock	 and	 George	 Loewenstein,	 ‘Explaining	 bargaining	 impasse:	
the	 role	 of	 self-serving	 biases’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Perspectives,	 11	 (1997),	 109–26;	 Erica	 Dawson,	 et	 al.,	
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Against	 this	 background,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 appreciate	why	 the	 attitude	 I	 earlier	designated	 law-
indifference	 renders	 its	 possessors	 highly	 prone	 to	 substantive	 errors.	This	 type	of	 attitude	
does	 nothing	 to	 predispose	 its	 possessors	 against	 the	 foregoing	 situational	 biases.	 It	 fails	 to	
generate	 in	 them	 any	 form	 of	 systematic	 resistance	 to	 those	 biases	 against	 compliance,	 and	
leaves	 them	 far	 too	exposed	and	amenable	to	their	influence.	Subjects	with	this	attitude,	then,	
are	likely	to	end	up	defying	the	law	where	they	ought	to	follow	it.	Law-indifference	is	therefore	
not	an	attitude	that	(in	a	reasonably	just	state)	individuals	should	generally	aspire	 to	 have	 and	
society	should	nurture	in	its	members.	
Before	turning	to	what	I	consider	to	be	the	desirable	attitude	towards	law,	I	should	add	two	
clarifications.	 First,	 I	 said	above	 that	a	 law-indifferent	attitude	 is	 liable	 to	 leave	 its	 possessors	
overly	 exposed	 to	 certain	 biases	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 result	 in	moral	and	practical	errors.	One	
element	of	this	argument,	which	may	be	worth	explicating	at	 this	point,	 is	 that	 law-indifferent	
actors	are	not	 likely	 to	effectively	detect	 those	biases	and	correct	 for	 them	on	a	 case-by-case	
basis,	 without	 changing	 their	 general	 attitude	 towards	 law.	 This	 is	 so	 because	 in	 situations	
where	individuals	are	affected	by	biases,	they	tend	not	to	recognise	the	fact	that,	or	the	degree	
to	which,	they	are	thus	affected.	It	is	part	of	the	nature	of	biases	that	they	largely	operate	at	an	
unconscious	or	not	 fully	 conscious	 level.	They	colour	our	perception	of	things	while	leaving	us	
under	the	impression	that	we	see	things	as	they	are.	This	much	is	implied	by	the	very	notion	of	
bias.	 But	 it	 also	 finds	 ample	 empirical	 support	 in	 recent	 experimental	 studies,	 where	 the	
tendency	 for	 people	 to	 overlook	 their	 own	 biases	 or	 underestimate	 their	 extent	 has	 been	
borne	out	and	given	the	name	the	bias	blind	spot.54	
A	second	clarification	worth	making	is	that	nothing	in	what	I	say	here	is	meant	to	suggest	that	
cultivating	a	 certain	normative	attitude	towards	 law	 is	 the	only	measure	by	which	compliance	
with	 law	 can	 be	 encouraged.	 There	 are,	 of	 course,	 other	 measures	 that	 legal	 systems	 can		
and	 do	 employ	 to	 this	 end.	 Notably,	 they	 create	 prudential	 reasons	 not	 to	 violate	 their		
laws	 by	 threatening	 to	 punish	 those	 who	 do	 so.	 It	 is	 crucial	 to	 recognise,	 however,	 that		
although	 legal	punishment	 is	probably	necessary	 for	 the	efficacy	of	 a	 legal	 system,	 it	 is	 by	no	
means	sufficient	for	 it.55		 	 For	 one	 thing,	 the	 economic	 and	 practical	 constraints	within	which	
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enforcement	 institutions	 inevitably	 operate	mean	 that	 there	 is	 only	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	 law	
violation	that	 they	can	monitor,	 investigate,	prosecute,	and	punish.	A	 legal	 system,	 therefore,	
cannot	 depend	 for	 its	 efficacy	solely	 or	 even	mainly	on	 coercive	enforcement	measures.	And	
even	 if	 such	a	 system	were	possible,	the	 frequency	and	 intensity	with	which	 it	would	have	to	
punish	 people	 and	 use	 auxiliary	 enforcement	 measures,	 such	 as	 surveillance,	 searches,	 and	
arrests,	would	render	it	a	radically	unpalatable	method	of	governance.	
If	 these	 observations	 are	 correct,	 a	 legal	 system	 requires	 for	 its	 efficacy	 not	 only	 coercive	
measures	of	enforcement,	but	also	the	prevalence	of	a	certain	normative	attitude	 towards	 law:	
namely,	 it	 is	 requisite	 that	 the	 bulk	 of	 its	 subjects	 be	 law-abiding	 citizens—that	 they		
possess	 an		attitude	 which		may		be		called		a	law-abiding	disposition.56	As	I	understand	it,	this	
attitude	has	three	notable	characteristics:		(i)		as		 is		often		the		case		with		attitudes,		it		has		a		
degree	 	 of	 deep-seatedness	 and	 persistence—it	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 momentary	 response	 to	 a	
particular	 situation	or	 a	 fleeting	state	of	mind,	but	 rather	normally	an	 attitude	that	 the	actor	
has	absorbed	from	a	relatively	early	stage	of	his	upbringing	and	that	 tends	 to	 endure	 through	
time;57		(ii)	 a	 person	with	 this	 attitude	normally	regards	the	fact	that	law	requires	an	action	as	a	
reason	for	 its	performance—law	has	acquired	in	her	practical	deliberation	the	significance	of	a	
reason	 that	 applies	 independently	 of	 situational	 assessments	 of	 whether	 particular	 acts	 of	
compliance	would	serve	the	substantive	goals	or	values	underlying	it;	and	(iii)	she	assigns	that	
reason	a	degree	of	priority	that	allows	it	to	ordinarily	(but	not	always,	come	what	may)	 prevail	
within	 its	 scope	of	 application.	 In	 other	words,	 she	 is	 generally	inclined	to	follow	the	law.	This	
does	 not	mean	 that,	when	 faced	with	 a	 legal	 requirement,	 other	 reasons	 cease	 to	 have	 any	
practical	 significance	 for	 her.	 An	 inclination	 to	 comply	 with	 law,	 being	 no	 more	 than	 an	
inclination,	 need	 not	 be	 absolutely	 determinative	 of	 how	 one	 acts	 in	 a	 given	 situation;		
rather,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 remain	 overridable	 by	 sufficiently	 powerful	 reasons	 against		
compliance	 which	 may	 crop	 up	 in	 a	 specific	 situation.	 But	 the	 attitude	 in	 question		






law,	which	means	 that	 they	usually	do	 so—but	 they	need	not	always	obey	 the	 law.	Edmundson	has	gone	further	
by	 distinguishing	 the	 former	 (or,	 what	 he	 calls	 law-abidance)	 from	 being	 disposed	 to	 obey	 the	 law	 (William	 A.	
Edmundson,	‘The	virtue	of	law-abidance’,	Philosophers’	Imprint,	6	(2006),	1–18	at	pp.	2–5,	7).	I	will	not	make	use	of	
this	further	distinction	here.	I	will	use	phrases	 such	 as	 ‘disposition	to	 comply	with	 law’	 interchangeably	with	 ‘law-
abiding	 disposition’.	Other	differences	between	Edmundson’s	stance	and	mine	involve,	firstly,	the	content	of	what	
he	calls	law-abidance	and	what	I	call	a	law-abiding	disposition;	and,	secondly,	the	fact	that,	unlike	him,	I	do	not	 cast	
my	 argument	 in	 terms	 of	 virtue	 ethics.	 In	 this	 connexion,	 see	 Aristotle’s	 virtue-oriented	 approach	 to	 law-
abidingness	as	expressed	in	Nicomachean	Ethics,	bk.	V,	1129a30–b15,	and	Politics,	bk.	III,	1277a25–7,	b13–17,	bk.	V,	
1307b1–5.	
57	 I	 say	 ‘tends’	 because	 the	 attitude	 under	 discussion	 need	 not	 be	 a	 permanent	 attitude	 that	 can	never	 be	








extensive	 deliberation	 on	 the	 reasons	 underlying	 the	 law	 and	 actively	 examine	 their	
applicability	and	weight	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
It	is	easy	to	see	how	this	practical	attitude	can	serve	as	an	effective	counterforce	to	the	earlier-
discussed	situational	biases	against	compliance	with	 law.	Since	people	 with	 this	 attitude	 treat	
law	 as	 a	 reason	 independently	 of	 case-by-case	assessments	of	substantive	considerations	for	
compliance,	the	biases	implicated	in	such	assessments	will	have	less	influence	on	their	decisions	
under	the	law.	By	thus	treating	law,	they	let	its	normative	force	feed	into	their	decisions	without	
first	being	mediated	 and	watered	 down	 by	 the	 situational	 biases	 discussed	 above.	Moreover,	
because	 such	 actors	 are	 disposed	 to	 treat	 legal	 requirements	as	 reasons	 that	 ordinarily	 take	
priority	within	their	ambit,	they	are	less	prone	to	be	swayed	into	 lawbreaking	by	 those	 undue	
influences	that	their	daily	environment	of	decision-making	tends	to	trigger.	
Before	 bringing	 the	 discussion	 to	 a	 close,	 it	 will	 be	 useful	 to	 consider	 the	 arguments	 of	
another	 theorist	who	has	given	attention	to	 the	attitudinal	dimension	of	 our	 problem—Leslie	





[on	 one’s	 own	 view	of	 the	merits]’.59	 This,	 however,	 seems	 to	 overlook	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	
inclination	or	 tendency	whose	 influence	on	 our	conduct	 is	overridable,	rather	 than	absolutely	
determinative	 of	 how	 we	 act	 in	 a	 given	 situation.	 That	 is	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 the	 law-abiding	
disposition	advocated	here.	 While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 such	 a	 disposition	 exerts	 upon	 us	 a	 force	
which	 is	content-independent,60	this	does	not	mean	that	it	also	excludes	from	our	horizon	other,	
content-dependent	 factors,	 which	 may	 compete	 with	 it	 and,	 when	 sufficiently	 powerful,	
override	 it.	 Content-independence	 of	 a	 given	 factor	 does	 not	 entail	 the	 exclusion	 of	 other,	
competing	factors.	Moreover,	law-abiding	dispositions	may	vary	in	strength—they	can	be	weaker	
or	stronger—and	although	some	individuals	might	have	too	strong	a	disposition	to	comply	with	
legal	 directives,	there	is	no	reason	why	this	should	be	the	case	with	most	people,	at	 least	 not	
within	the	context	of	political	cultures	less	than	radically	authoritarian.	There	is	no	reason	why	the	
ordinary	and	common	disposition	to	comply	with	law	may	not	fall	within	reasonable	bounds	in	
terms	of	 its	 strength;	and	even	 if	 such	a	disposition	is	a	tool	that	inevitably	retains	a	degree	of	
















there	is	another	factor	which	I	think	his	analysis	underestimates:	that	 is,	 the	 essential	 role	 that	
such	 an	 attitude	has	 in	 counteracting	common	biases	against	compliance,	as	explicated	above.	
He	 seems	 to	 suppose	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 such	 an	 attitude	 would	 not	 result	 in	 an	
unacceptable	 quantum	 of	 disobedience	 because	 reasons	 of	 prudence	 and	 beneficence	 that	
favour	 compliance—such	 as	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 punished	 and	 of	 stimulating	 others	 into	
unjustified	 disobedience—would	 still	 have	 their	 say	 in	 people’s	 practical	 deliberation.61	 As	
argued	above,	however,	the	prudential	reasons	which	punishment		institutions		can		realistically		
and	 	palatably	 	generate	 	would	 	not	suffice	as	 a	 countermeasure	against	common	situational	
biases.62	As	for	reasons	of	beneficence:	common	biases	of	the	kind	discussed	above	mean	that	
even	 if	such	 reasons	 should	 get	 their	 full	 weight	 in	 the	 decision	 about	 whether	 to	comply	
or	not,	in	a	society	whose	members	are	not	predisposed	to	comply	with	law,	 too	 many	 people	
in	 too	 many	 cases	 would	 not	 actually	 accord	 those	 reasons	 their	 full	 weight.	 The	
disposition	 I	 endorse	here	 avoids	 this	 problem	because	it	exerts	its	force	independently	of	our	
situational	assessments	and	the	biases	they	implicate.63	
If	 I	 am	 right	 to	 make	 the	 observations	 I	 have	 made	 here	 about	 the	 frequent	 presence	 of	
situational	 biases	 against	 compliance	 in	 our	 everyday	 settings	 of	 activity,	 about	 the	
shortcomings	of	punishment	practices,	and	about	the	role	that	our	 law-abiding	disposition	can	







63	Green	 endorses	 what	 he	 calls	 a	 virtue	 of	 civility	 or	 restraint,	 which	 ‘counsel[s]	 compliance’	 in	 some	cases	
where	the	injustice	of	a	law	‘is	found	to	be	both	within	the	bounds	of	tolerability	and	not	easily	avoided’	(Green,	The	
Authority	 of	 the	 State,	 p.	 265).	 These	 cases	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 encompass	 all	 the	 error-prone	 situations	 I	 have	
discussed	 above,	 but	 even	 insofar	 as	 they	 do	 there	 remains	 the	following	question:	does	Green	believe	that	this	




64	 I	 take	no	 stance	here	on	whether	 these	 reasons,	as	 far	 as	 they	apply	 to	 the	person	acquiring	 this	 attitude,	
should	be	classified	as	 ‘state-given’	reasons	to	have	this	attitude	or	 ‘object-given’	reasons	to	try	to	bring	it	about	
that	one	has	it	or	to	cause	oneself	to	have	it.	The	wording	I	have	mostly	used	in	this	 context—for	example,	 reasons	
to	 adopt/cultivate	 this	 attitude—is,	 I	 think,	 reconcilable	 with	 either	 alternative.	 For	 the	 debate	 regarding	
state/object-given	 reasons	 (framed	 in	 these	 or	 similar	 terms)	 see,	 e.g.,	 Robert	 Dunn,	 ‘Akratic	 attitudes	 and	
rationality’,	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy,	70	 (1992),	24–39;	Derek	Parfit,	‘Reasons	and	 rationality’,	Exploring	
Practical	Philosophy,	ed.	D.	Egonsson,	et	 al.	 (Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate,	2001),	pp.	17–39;	Berent	Enç,	How	We	Act:	
Causes,	Reasons,	and	 Intentions	 (Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	2003),	pp.	30–7;	Christian	Piller,	 ‘Content-	related	and	
attitude-related	reasons	for	preferences’,	Philosophy,	81	(2006),	155–81;	James	Morauta,	‘In	defence	of	state-based	











I	have	begun	this	inquiry	with	a	discussion	of	normative	grounds	for	the	obligation	 to	 obey	 the	
law,	 focusing	 primarily	 on	 considerations	 of	 necessity	and	 fairness.	We	 have	 seen	 that	 these	
considerations	gain	much	of	 their	 force	not	through	their	separate	and	independent	operation,	
but	 rather	 through	 their	 symbiotic,	mutually	 supportive	 relation	 (as	 expressed	 in	what	 I	 have	
called	 the	 integrated	 	 argument).	 	 This	 	 is	 	 so	 	 firstly	 	 because,	 	 unlike	 	 a	 	 pure	 	 necessity	
argument,	 the	 integrated	 argument	 holds	 good	 beyond	 the	 confines	of	 situations	 in	 which	 a	
disobedient	act	would	actually	destabilise	the	 law’s	effective	authority;	and	secondly	because,	
unlike	 the	 traditional	 fair-play	 argument,	 the	 integrated	 argument	 holds	 good	 regardless	 of	
whether	 the	 relevant	 actor	 has	 voluntarily	 chosen	 the	 goods	 in	 question.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	
integrated	argument	yields	 an	 obligation	 whose	 scope	 is	 considerably	 wider	 than	 the	 sum	
of	 its	parts.	
Nevertheless,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 even	 the	 integrated	 argument	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 all	
circumstances	of	our	action	under	the	law.	For	instance,	it	does	not	apply	to	situations	in	which	
even	 if	 everyone	 disobeyed	 no	 harm	 would	 follow	 (and	 no	 benefit	 would	 ensue	 from	 their	
obedience),	as	 in	 the	 case	of	 a	 driver	who	 comes	upon	a	traffic	 light	on	a	lonely	road	with	no	
other	car	or	pedestrian	in	the	vicinity.	In	such	circumstances	an	act	of	 law	violation	would	have	
no	adverse	effect	whatsoever,	even	 if	performed	by	everyone	who	 found	themselves	 in	 these	
circumstances.	Thus,	an	actor	who	contravenes	the	law	in	such	a	situation	does	not	assume	by	
that	very	act	a	liberty	or	an	advantage	that,	as	a	rational	actor,	she	would	not	be	willing	to	extend	
to	 others.	 This	means	 that	 her	 act	 should	 not	 be	 regarded	as	 an	 unfair	 act	 precluded	by	 the	
integrated	argument—which	is	to	say	that	the	argument	fails	to	establish	an	obligation	to	obey	
the	law	in	the	general	sense	that	concerns	us.	
Subsequent	discussion,	however,	has	 led	 to	 a	 qualification	 of	 this	 position:	even	 if	 there	 is	
nothing	wrong	with	an	act	of	law	violation	done	in	situations	such	as	the	lonely	traffic	light	case,	
the	attitude	from	which	such	an	act	ensues	implicates	acute	problems.	Most	notably,	it	leaves	its	





act	 of	 compliance	would	 serve	 the	 substantive	goals	behind	the	 law,	and	which	enjoys	some	
degree	 of	 priority	 within	 its	 scope	 of	 application.	 This	 attitude,	 I	 have	 argued,	 renders	 its	
possessors	 less	 prone	 to	 be	 swayed	 by	 situational	 biases	 against	 compliance	 with	 law.		












obligation	to	obey	the	 law	and	its	relation	to	the	value	 of	 a	 law-abiding	 disposition.	 I	 cannot	
claim	 to	 have	 done	 that	mainly	because,	as	cautioned	at	the	outset,65	my	analysis	has	assumed	
arguendo	at	least	one	premise	that	would	not	be	concurred	with	by	all	philosophers:66	namely,	
the	 premise	 that	 an	 action	 cannot	 be	 morally	 obligatory	 unless	 the	 action	 itself	 or	 its	
consequences	satisfy	or	serve	some	moral	value.	I	have	proceeded	on	this	premise	because	it	is	a	
premise	that	underlies	much	of	the	contemporary	scepticism	about	the	obligation	to	obey	 the	
law,67	 and	 because	 my	 main	 goal	 has	 been	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 even	 from	 that	 sceptical	
perspective	the	value	of	a	law-abiding	disposition	 should	 be	 acknowledged.	 A	 more	 definitive	
conclusion	 about	 the	obligation	to	obey	the	law,	however,	would	necessitate	a	close	examination	
of	 the	 above	 premise	 and	 its	 ethical	 foundations.	 If	 that	 premise	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 incorrect	
because,	 for	 instance,	 an	 action	 that	 serves	 no	 moral	 value	 can	 nonetheless	 be	 morally	
obligatory	 if	 it	 flows	 from	 an	 attitude	 (or	 an	 internalised	 maxim)	 that	 does,	 then	 the	
observations	I	have	made	here	may	after	all	translate	 into	an	obligation	to	obey	the	 law.	This,	
however,	is	a	question	that	lies	beyond	the	limits	I	have	set	for	the	present	inquiry.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
65	See	text	between	notes	9	and	11.	
66	See	notes	10	and	27.	
67	See	citations	in	note	11.	
